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Abstract
This paper examines the market conditions that facilitate the entry of for-profit
institutions into the higher education market. I show how, despite significant
government financial support for public institutions, for-profit institutions may
still find it profitable to enter the market. They do so by spending large amounts
of money on advertising campaigns in order to attract students who are rela-
tively more influenced by the persuasive effect of advertising. I show that entry is
more likely the more government subsidies are targeted directly toward students,
as opposed to institutions. Even if it decreases social welfare, the introduction
of market conditions that are friendly to for-profit universities will allow a gov-
ernment to fulfill its objective of increasing participation in the higher education
system.
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One prospective student with financial difficulties, the complaint said, was
promised in writing that “in five years she would have a job in a hospital, a big
house in Florida, enough money to go to Disney World with her family and a
new Lexus.”
- The New York Times (2010)
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1. Introduction
The last twenty years, public, private not-for-profit and private for-profit
HEIs in the United States have all experienced an important increase in their
enrollment. Fig. 1 shows the evolution of the number of full time equivalent stu-
dents enrolled (in millions). We also observe that, up to the end of the nineties,
for-profit institutions were playing a minor role in the American higher educa-
tion landscape. According to the statistics of the U.S. department of Education
(U.S. Department of Education (2011)), they now enroll almost two millions of
students or more than 10% of the student population.
For-profit HEI’s are not uncontroversial. Several puzzling facts have sur-
Figure 1: Number of full-time equivalent students enrolled by type of institution (in millions)
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Source: U.S. Department of Education (2011).
rounded the large expansion of the for-profit sector.
First of all, Chung (2009), Deming et al. (2012), Cellini and Chaudhary (2012)
and Lang and Weinstein (2014) have observed that the quality (as measured
by the impact of education on employability, earnings or wages) of the degrees
offered by for-profit institution is lower, and at best equal, compared with the
ones offered at traditional higher education instituions (HEIs hereafter).
Secondly, According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2010), their
for-profit higher education programs are between six to thirteen times more ex-
pensive than the ones offered in comparable traditional institutions (community-
or four-year colleges).
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Thirdly, while only 10% of the students are going to a for-profit college, they
form 26% of the population of borrowers and 43% of the population of defaulters
(U.S. Department of Education (2011)). Further, Cellini (2012) computed that
a student will have a positive net return from going to a for-profit HEI if and
only if his additional earnings per year of education exceeds 8.5% while Cellini
and Chaudhary (2012) estimated average earning gains between 6% and 8%.
Considering that for-profit institutions are offering programs in fields with high
job prospects (Kinser (2007)), this raises for a majority of students the question
of the worthiness of this human capital investment.
These observations are even more puzzling knowing that students see the pro-
grams offered by for-profit and by traditional (public and not-for-profit) institu-
tions as closed substitutes (Cellini (2009)). According to Chung (2012), this is
particularly true for students with relatively lower cognitive and non-cognitive
skills. Hence, both types of institutions have an overlapping student base and
are active in the same market.
At first sight, if students were balancing the costs and benefits of education2,
they would quite likely have earned a higher net return by going to a traditional
HEI and, even, by not studying further at all. The objective of this paper is to
see how it is possible to reconcile these observations surrounding the emergence
of for-profit HEIs and the theory of human capital.
Our main argument is that, in order to attract students, for-profit institutions
invest intensively in advertising campaigns. This strategy aims at attracting
students by increasing their perceived benefits of studying in a for-profit insti-
tution.
Table 1 compares the advertising intensities (total advertising expenditures di-
vided by revenues) of the ten most famous for-profit HEIs, of a traditional
(private not-for-profit/public) HEI and the average of the U.S.’s top ten mar-
keters. This ratio is twenty times higher for for-profit institutions compared
with a traditional one. The marketing intensity of the for-profit institutions
is on average more than twice higher than for the average American top ten
marketer. None of these firms even reaches the ratio of the least advertising
intensive for-profit institution in our sample3. These differences are even bigger
if we also consider expenses related with the recruitment and the admission of
students. Based on the financial data of the thirty biggest for-profit companies,
U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (2012) ob-
served that a total of 22, 7% of their revenues are spent in these two categories.
2In this paper, we abstract from the externalities created by higher education. Few is known
about the non-monetary effects created by for-profit higher education. Persell and Wenglinsky
(2004) is an exception. They observed that compared with traditional education, for-profit
education has a negative impact on the civic behavior of students (they are less likely to vote,
to participate in political activities and to become involved in their communities (through,
for example, voluntary work)). This empirical result can be added to the list of puzzling facts
surrounding for-profit higher education.
3According to www.wordstream.com, the University of Phoenix, which is the largest for-
profit HEI, was Google’s biggest advertiser in 2012 and spent close to $170,000 a day on
Adwords.
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Not only the size of their investment in advertising has pulled the attention.
Testings by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2010) have shown that
for-profit institutions have repeatedly engaged in questionable marketing prac-
tices. In their recruitment campaigns, several for-profit colleges were accused of
exaggerating after graduation salary, of giving false information about the col-
lege’s accreditation, of misrepresenting graduation rates or future employment
perspectives. Similar conclusions have been drawn by the U.S. Senate Com-
mittee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (2012). Several litigations
concerning deceptive recruitment practices are still pending4.
Table 1: Advertising intensities of HEIs and of the average top ten marketer in the U.S.
Marketer Advertising Intensity
American Public education 11.1%
Apollo Group 12.7%
Bridgepoint Education 11%
Capella Education 15.1%
Career Education, Inc. 14.3%
Corinthian Colleges Inc. 9.2%
DeVry Inc. 11.7%
Education Management 10.4%
Strayer Education Inc. 11%
Universal Technical Institute 7.5%
Traditional American HEI maximum 0.5%
Average top 10 marketer 4.7%
Source: Steinerman et al. (2011), LipmanHearne (2010) and Belleflamme and Peitz (2010).
This paper develops a theoretical framework of how for-profit institutions
were able to enter the higher education market by investing into advertising
and influence the student’s perceived benefits that can be derived from their
educational programs. Through their advertising campaigns, they are able (1)
to segment a share of the student’s market that then would consider their ex-
istence when deciding to pursue their studies and (2) to persuade them of the
supposedly high benefits that can be derived from following their programs
(Ko¨nigbauer (2007)). Due to a more important naivety bias, students who are
normally relatively less inclined to go to a traditional institution will be rela-
tively more impacted by the persuasive effect of advertising. In other words,
advertising will explain the overestimation of the benefits from studying in a
for-profit HEI5.
4See the discussions in articles of the The Economist (2010) and of The New York Times
(2010)
5A closely related argument has been developed in intertemporal behavioral models
(DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004)) to explain puzzling quality/price market outcomes for
goods and services with delayed benefits. Observed consumer decision making can be predicted
by assuming that they are naive as defined by the overconfidence about the time inconsistency
of the consumer’s preferences. Note that compared to this approach, the student’s decision
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We formalize this idea by building a mixed-duopoly model between HEIs (as in
Del Rey (2009)) where the incumbent has multiple objectives. On one side it
cares about the prestige derived from the educational programs it offers and on
the other side it values the research produced in the institution. The threat of
entry by a for-profit firm, which uses educational programs to attain its financial
objectives, is endogenized.
Our main findings are the following. The model supports the fact that for-profit
HEIs tend to fix a higher tuition fee the more students are subsidized to study
there. This is in line with the Bennett Hypothesis according to which insti-
tutions are reacting to an increase in the subsidized loans or grants programs
available to students by setting higher fees. Second, we show how a change
towards a demand-side funding of education (where students are subsidized to
study), rather than a supply-side funding system (where HEIs are subsidized),
is facilitating the entry of for-profit HEIs when students have access to this
loan/grant system to go study there. This model brings attention to one of the
caveats of the use of demand-side subsidies as suggested by the Tiebout hypoth-
esis: the consequence related with the inability of students to assess correctly
the benefits of education. Third, we derive the conditions under which for-profit
HEIs will prefer not to improve the quality of the education it provides. Fourth,
we highlight how the decreasing importance given by traditional HEIs to ed-
ucation (at the gain of research for example) has facilitated the emergence of
for-profit HEIs. Finally, despite the decrease in social welfare that it creates,
we highlight why governmental authorities might still find it profitable to ease
the entry of for-profit institutions. We argue that it allows them to better reach
their objective of widening the participation of students to the higher education
system.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the explanations of the
emergence of for-profit HEIs developed in the economics and in the higher edu-
cation policy literature. The policy context is exposed in Section 3. The model
is developed in Section 4. In Section 5, the equilibrium outcome is described as
well as a welfare analysis. Section 6 discusses the robustness of our results as
well as its policy implications. Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature Review
Several explanations of the emergence of for-profit institutions have already
been discussed in the economic and higher education literature (see Breneman
et al. (2006) for a detailled coverage on this issue).
On the supply side, Ortmann (2001) and Kinser (2007) argue that the business
model of for-profit institutions makes them more cost effective. Many for-profit
institutions have shifted from being enterprise colleges owned and managed
making process is simplified and static. We rather focus on the role played by this naivety
bias (as in Gabaix and Laibson (2006)) on the strategic interactions between institutions.
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by the same judicial person (individual, family or corporation) towards multi-
campus/publicly traded corporations. This has allowed them to take advantage
of regulatory/marketing economies of scale and to have quickly access to funds
in order to be responsive to the market demand. For Winston (1999), the objec-
tive of traditional (public or not-for-profit) HEIs makes them less cost effective.
This is due to the positional nature of competition which makes them waste
resources in order to achieve a higher rank in the hierarchy of HEIs, by invest-
ing in research rather than in their educational programs. According to Turner
(2006), for-profit providers were able to enter the market thanks to the inelastic
supply of traditional institution.6
On the demand side, the reduction in the gap between the price to be paid to
go to a traditional and to go to a for-profit institution has been reduced (Cellini
(2010)). On the one hand, the last ten years, traditional institutions have raised
their tuition fees. On the other hand, there has been an increase in the funding
going to Federal Pell Grant and GI Bill which students going to for-profit col-
leges are entitled to use. Coupled with the increasing demand for education, this
change could explain the recent emergence of for-profit institutions. A second
possbile explanation has been developed by Brunello and Rocco (2008) in the
context of compulsory education. Their basic idea is that private institutions
offer programs of a lower standard which means that students can graduate for a
lower cost of effort. They show that this outcome can survive a majority voting
system if the costs of a higher standard for the private school are low compare
to its benefits. Low standards were alleged by a report of the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (2011)). In the context of higher education, note that this
concept of effort cost could even be extended to the one of opportunity cost as
for-profit institutions tend to be located in easily accessible places (highway ex-
its, shopping malls, business districts, etc.) and offer very flexible programs (not
only semester programs, evening/week-end classes, accelerated degrees, etc.).
However, these explanations cannot altogether reconcile the co-existence of our
puzzling facts without violating the theory of human capital. At best, Turner
(2006)’s and Brunello and Rocco (2008)’s argumentations could be used to ex-
plain why students decide to invest in for-profit instead of traditional higher
education, even if the latter is cheaper and of a higher quality. However, this
could not be used to explain why they decided to make this human capital in-
vestment. The aim of this paper is to offer a model that could encompass this
possibility.
6As the number of community colleges (often seen by the student population as the clos-
est option outside of for-profit HEIs) was stable throughout the last 20 years, individual
institutions have increased the size of their enrollment by more than 40%. The elasticity of
substitution of community colleges computed by (Bound and Turner (2007)) is of 0.88. Hence,
capacity constraints were not important at the agregate level. However, as discussed in Turner
(2006) and Cellini (2009), rationing might have been an issue in some areas.
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3. Policy Context
On June 2, 2011, the Obama administration released the “gainful employ-
ment regulations” which change the conditions to qualify for federal aid (for-
profit institutions are eligible for these “Title IV” funds since 1972 and the
change of the Higher Education Amendments of 1965). These regulations were
introduced after the growing discontent around for-profit colleges. Several cri-
teria will have to be respected by the institutions hosting students receiving
federal aid: (1) loan repayment by at least 35% of the students formerly en-
rolled in, (2) an annual loan payment which is less than 30% of her or his
discretionary income or an annual loan payment that does not exceed 12% of
the total earnings. However, due to a federal court rule blocking one of these
criteria, these regulations are not yet implemented and new rules are still being
negotiated (The Chronicle of Higher Education (2013)).
In the United Kingdom, the financing mode of universities changed starting
from the academic year 2012/2013. Direct teaching grants given to universities
have since then decreased and they are instead financed by the higher tuition
fee paid by students. From there on, universities were able to fix their tuition
fee up to £9,000 (as opposed to £3,375 before). Next to this, a subsidized in-
come contingent loan system was introduced. Only the accredited universities
are entitled to enroll subsidized students. Since 2010, BPP University College
and the Greenwich School of Management are the only for-profit HEI with an
accreditation. A white paper (which discusses new policy directions on a partic-
ular topic and nourishes the democratic debates) has recently been published.
It discusses the possibility to further open the doors to private for-profit HEIs
in order to “promote the development of a more diverse, dynamic and respon-
sive higher education sector where funding follows the student and the forces
of competition replace the burdens of bureaucracy in driving up the quality of
the academic experience” (U.K. Department for Business Innovation and Skills
(2011), p.24). In other words, they believe that the competition created by
for-profit providers can lead to a better functioning of traditional HEI’s by cre-
ating a disciplining effect. A new regulatory framework was expected for the
academic year 2012/2013. Howevern according to some media (The Telegraph
(2012)), these plans have been postponed.
The presence of for-profit HEIs is quite marginal in the rest of Europe (except
for some advanced specialized programs and in some Eastern European coun-
tries). Although, there is a push by policymakers to promote a different funding
system for European universities (Aghion et al. (2010) and Van Der Ploeg and
Veugelers (2008)). They argue for a bigger private investment in higher edu-
cation, especially through an increase in tuition fees. However, students would
also have access to funding sources to finance their education expenditures in
the form of competitive grants and through a loan system. Depending on the
system that would accreditate universities, this might open the doors of the
higher education sector to new institutions including for-profit ones.
For-profit HEIs are quite active in Chile and in some Asian countries (Kinser
and Levy (2006)). Although, it is difficult to find accurate information about
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these countries. Their legislations are quite different and relatively difficult to
grasp. The ownership structure of for-profit institutions are also very different
(less likely to be multi-campus publicly traded institutions) and the information
about them is quite diffuse.
4. The Model
In this section, we first derive the case where the traditional HEI acts as a
monopoly. Then, we derive the case where entry of a for-profit HEI can occur
and the three possible kinds of behavior of the traditional HEI: blockaded entry
(where it acts as a monopoly and no entry is observed), deterred entry (where
the traditional HEI strategically drives the for-profit HEI out of the market)
and accommodated entry (where entry takes place).
4.1. Monopoly Case
Students decide whether or not they want to study in a traditional HEI based
on a very simple static cost-benefit analysis. On the one hand, they benefit from
studying because it increases their productivity. This can be interpreted as the
discounted present value of further studying. On the other hand, they have to
pay a fee which can be partially subsidized in order to enroll higher education.
This can be done in the form of a grant, a voucher system, a student allowance
or a loan system (only the subsidized part).
We assume that the productivity premium depends on qu, the quality of the ed-
ucation provided, and on the student’s ability θs which is uniformly distributed
between 0 and 1. The tuition fee to be paid to the HEI is represented by fu.
Students only pay a share zu of this tuition fee. The government subsidizes the
1 − zu share left. A student will decide to go study if his net utility is weakly
positive. The net utility of going to the traditional HEI is such that:
Ut(θs) = θsqu − zufu
The students’ net utility derived from their education decision are shown in Fig.
2. Note that the student’s participation decision is endogeneous and that the
market is not fully covered, as this is one of the peculiarity of higher education
compared with compulsory education.
The traditional (not-for-profit/public) HEI maximizes its utility Uu subject
to a budget constraint. Utility is composed of two elements: one related with
its educational activities and the other one which is related with its research
activities7. When valuing education, we assume that the traditional HEI cares
7This second objective captures the fact that teaching activities have an opportunity cost.
Interpreting it as research activities seems quite natural if we think of a research university. For
other type of institutions, this can also be interpreted as the other missions (like local economic
development for community college or the spread of beliefs for religious institutions) followed
by the institution. This can also be interpreted as the extent of rent seeking expenditures
arising in the institution (although we will assume that the social welfare will positively
increase in R in our welfare analysis).
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Figure 2: Student’s utility derived from studying in a traditional HEI
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about the total productivity increase it creates. For simplicity, research activ-
ities are valued by the revenues invested to finance this activity. The relative
importance that the HEI gives to its education output compared to its research
output is described by γ. The objective of the traditional HEI can be rewritten
as:
γ
∫ 1
θs
θsqu dθs +R (1)
The traditional HEI’s budget is as follows. Revenues are solely on a per-student
base. The institution receives fu from the students and, in addition, the govern-
ment gives a direct per-student subsidy su. There are two types of expenditures:
the ones related with the amount of money invested into research as represented
by R and a per-student cost of providing education cu. We assume that the unit
cost of education is linearly increasing in its quality such that: cu = δqu. The
budget constraint of the traditional HEI is as follows:
Nufu +Nusu = R+Nucu (2)
We suppose that the only tool at the disposal of the HEI in order to balance
its expenditures between research and education is to choose the quality of its
education qu. In this monopoly case, the timing of the game is the following:
Stage 1: The HEI chooses the quality of its educational programs.
Stage 2: Students decide whether or not to go study.
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With this specification, we have in stage 2 that the indifferent student is repre-
sented by θ = zufuqu and the student’s enrollment is Nu = 1− θ.
In stage 1 of the model, we can rewrite the budget constraint in Eq. 2 explic-
itly with respect to R and replace it in the objective function in Eq. 1. After
simplification, we have that:
γ
∫ 1
θs
θsqu dθs+(1−θ)(fu+su− δqu) = γ qu
2
(
1− ( zufu
qu
)2
)
+(1− zufu
qu
)(fu+su− δqu) (3)
The first order condition from maximizing Eq. 3 with respect to qu is:
γ
2
(
1− (zufu
q∗u
)2
)
+ γ(
zuq
∗
u
q∗u
)2 − δ(1− zufu
q∗u
) + (su − δq∗u + fu)
zufu
(q∗u)2
= 0 (4)
From a marginal change in qu, we can disentangle several effects. The first two
are positive and are related with the change it creates on the total student pro-
ductivity derived from higher education. The first effect is due to the increased
productivity created by the improved quality of education and the second comes
from the additional student which is enrolled at the margin. The last two ef-
fects are related with the research activities. The first of these two effects is
the direct decrease in funding diverted to education instead of research and is
always negative. The second can be either positive or negative and is due to the
higher number of students enrolled which is an additional source of income but
also of expenditure. From Eq. 4, we find that at the optimum, the monopoly
HEI will set the quality of its education at:
q∗u =
√
γ(zufu)2 + 2zufusu + 2zuf2u
2δ − γ
We assume that 2δ − γ > 0 is respected, otherwise the two first positive effects
will be too important and an infinitely high quality level will be chosen. There-
fore, we have that the quality of education chosen increases in fu, in γ, in su
and decreases in δ. An increase in zu will also lead to an increase in the quality
of the programs offered. This is needed to compensate for the rise in tuition to
be paid in order to keep attracting students.
4.2. Entry Case
We now consider the case where entry can take place. This decision will
depend on the impact of the different parameters of the model on the anticipated
profit of the for-profit HEI. It depends on the direct impact of a parameter on
the anticipated profit and on the indirect impact related with the quality of
education chosen by the traditional HEI. This quality level will be chosen in
order to block, deter or accommodate entry. The for-profit institution will try to
enter the market of higher education thanks to intensive advertising campaigns.
In this entry case, the strategic game takes place as follows:
Stage 1: The traditional HEI chooses the quality of its programs.
Stage 2: The for-profit institution decides to enter the market of higher edu-
cation or not.
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Stage 3: If it enters, the for-profit institution sets its level of advertising and
its tuition fee.
Stage 4: Students decide whether and where to go study.
The advertising technology is modeled in a way similar to Ko¨nigbauer (2007). It
plays the dual role of segmenting the market by making a share of the student’s
population consider their existence when making their education decision and
of persuading those students to go there by distorting upwards the perceived
benefits that can be derived from the education provided.
Formally, we have that a fraction φ of the students considers the existence of the
for-profit HEI when making their educational choice. This is the exposed part
of the student population. The 1− φ students left are unexposed and can only
decide whether or not to go study at a traditional HEI. The cost of advertising
is such that: Φ(φ) = φ
2
2 . The fraction of exposed students is randomly chosen
from the student’s population, i.e. it is independent from the student’s types.
The perceived benefits of education for the exposed students depend both on
the quality of education provided and on the distortion created by advertis-
ing. These two parts cannot be disentangled by the students but are known by
both HEIs. As in a traditional HEI, we assume that more able students benefit
more from the quality of education provided at a for-profit HEI, as represented
by qpi. The upward bias created by the persuasive effect of advertising posi-
tively depends on t, the maximum level of opacity concerning the benefits of
further studying. In the context of higher education, this opacity arises from
the impossibility to certify ex-ante that the perceived benefits received from an
educational program will be effective. We assume that this persuasive effect is
smaller for relatively more able students. This hypothesis is supported by the
cognitive learning literature which analyze how people respond differently to
persuasive communication (see a.o. Greenwald (1968)). In the higher education
context, it also seems to be supported by Chung (2012) who observes that stu-
dents with relatively less cognitive and non-cognitive skills are the ones with the
more misconceptions about the perceived benefits from higher education. The
specification of the distortion created by the persuasive effect of advertising will
be (1−θs)t. For simplicity, we suppose that these two effects enter the student’s
utility function in an additively separable manner. This way, we will have that
relatively less able students will be the most tempted to study in a for-profit
HEI.
The costs for students to follow a program at a for-profit HEI is similar than
for a traditional HEI as it has to pay a fee fpi and only a share zpi must be paid
by the students, the rest being subsidized by public funds. The students’ net
utility of going to a for-profit HEI are such that:
Upi(θs) = θsqpi + (1− θs)t− zpifpi
Both the students’ net utility of going to a for-profit or a traditional HEI are
pictured in Fig. 3. Remark that an increase in t will change the slope of the
student’s utility derived from going to a for-profit institution. The for-profit HEI
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Figure 3: Student’s utility derived from studying in a traditional or a for-profit HEI
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-zufu 
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does not get any direct funding from the government, although their students
can be subsidized to study there at a co-payment rate zpi. In addition to a
per-student unit cost of education linearly increasing in the quality of education
cpi = χqpi, it must pay a fixed entry cost F and the cost of advertising. N
e
pi is the
share of exposed students who decide to enroll the for-profit HEI. When entry
occurs, the maximization problem of the for-profit HEI is such that:
max
φ,fpi
φNepi(fpi − cpi)−
φ2
2
− F (5)
We solve the game backwards starting from the student’s decision to partici-
pate.
We will make further restrictions on the parameters analyzed. In line with the
American higher education landscape discussed in the introduction, we assume
that the quality of education is higher in the traditional system (qu > qpi) and
that the education provided there is less costly (fpi > fu). In our framework,
qpi is exogenous. This can be interpreted as the minimum level required to be
entitled to host students receiving government subsidies8. We also assume that
8Although, we will be able to show, in Section 6, the condition needed such that an increase
in qpi has a negative impact on the entrant’s profit, i.e. the condition such that the for-profit
institution has no incentive to improve the quality of its education if it had the opportunity
to.
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t = 0 for traditional institution in the exposed market and that they will not
try to persuade students via advertising campaigns.
This is in line with what we observe and the conclusions drawn by the incom-
plete contract theory literature. The ownership structure of traditional HEI,
more precisely their non-distribution constraint, plays a commitment role. First,
as argued in Hansmann (1980) and in Glaeser and Shleifer (2001), it commits
them to invest in the non-contractable quality of what they offer in the market.
Second, as argued in Bubb and Kaufman (2013), it commits them not to exploit
the existence of consumer biases as here via persuasive advertising.
Stage 4
We have two student’s markets depending on whether or not they are ex-
posed to the presence of for-profit higher education. The probability to end up
in one of the two markets depends on the level of advertising φ which will be
chosen in stage 3 of the game.
For the 1− φ segment of unexposed students (u), the choice is between the tra-
ditional institution and not studying. Their enrollment function is such that:
Nuu = 1− θs = 1−
zufu
qu
In this segment of the market, the traditional HEI behaves as a monopoly.
For the φ segment of the exposed students (e), the choice is between the tradi-
tional and the for-profit HEI. The student of ability θ˜s is indifferent between the
two types of institutions such that Upi(θ˜s) = Ut(θ˜s). It can be explicitly defined
by θ˜s =
zufu−zpifpi+t
qu−(qpi−t) .
For tractability, we assume that the market for exposed students is fully cov-
ered. Two conditions, which can be better understood from Fig. 3, need to
be respected for this. The first condition (t ≥ zpifpi) guarantees that the least
able student, the one of type θs = 0, always decides to go study to a for-profit
institution. The second condition (t ≥ zpifpiqu−zufuqpiqu−zufu ) implies that the indiffer-
ent student derives a positive net utility from studying (Ut(θs) = Upi(θs) ≥ 0).
Hence, we will assume throughout the paper that t is sufficiently large, i.e.
t ≥ max (zpifpi, zpifpiqu−zufuqpiqu−zufu ).
For exposed students, the enrollments to the traditional and to the for-profit
institution are respectively:
Neu = 1− θ˜s = 1−
zufu − zpifpi + t
qu − (qpi − t) and N
e
pi = θ˜s =
zufu − zpifpi + t
qu − (qpi − t) (6)
Stage 3
Assuming that the for-profit HEI has entered the market in stage 2, we look
at the strategic decision made by the for-profit HEI. It chooses simultaneously
the amount to invest into advertising φ and the tuition fee fpi, i.e. the for-profit
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institution maximizes Eq. (5) considering Eq. (6). The first order conditions
with respect to respectively fpi and φ are:
φ∗θ˜s − φ∗zpi f
∗
pi − cpi
qu − (qpi + t) = 0
θ˜s(f
∗
pi − cpi)− φ∗ = 0
Relying on the first expression, two counteracting effects are created by an
incremental increase in fpi: it increases the revenues received by the for-profit
institution and it decreases the demand of students to go study there. The
second first order condition shows that increasing the amount of advertising
done will increase the revenues due to a higher demand but will increase the
cost related to advertising. At the optimum9, the solution of this system of
equation is unique and is such that:
f∗pi =
zufu + zpiχqpi + t
2zpi
and φ∗ =
(zufu − χqpizpi + t)2
4zpi(qu − (qpi − t))
Observe that f∗pi is decreasing in zpi, the share of the tuition fee which is paid
by the student. Therefore, under our specification, the Bennett Hypothesis,
according to which federal grants and student loans are leading to a tuition
increase, is observed. This seems in lign with Cellini and Goldin (2014) who
have empirically found that for-profit institutions have captured the increase in
tuition subsidies given to their students. The fee chosen by the for-profit HEI
is also increasing in the education cost parameter χ, in the quality of education
qpi, in the level of opacity t and in the net tuition fee paid by students going to
the traditional HEI zufu.
We have that the quantity of advertising is always decreasing with respect to zpi
and qu and increasing in t. It is also increasing
10 in zu and fu but decreasing in
χ. Depending on the parameters of the model, φ∗ can increase or decrease in qpi.
Stage 2
The condition that must be respected to observe the entry of the for-profit
institution is that it can anticipate a positive profit. It will depend on the
quality level of education chosen by the traditional institution in the first stage
of the game. Entering the market will be profitable when:
pi(qu) = φ
∗
(zufu − zpif∗pi + t
qu − (qpi − t)
)
(f∗pi − χqpi)−
(φ∗)2
2
− F ≥ 0
9The second order condition to be a maximum is such that: 2φzpi(qu− (qpi − t))− (zufu +
zpi(χqpi − 2fpi) + t)2 > 0. It will be checked ex-post.
10To show this, note that zufu − χqpizpi + t > 0 as cpi = χqpi , t ≥ zpifpi to have a fully
covered market of exposed students and that fpi > cpi otherwise it will not be able to make a
positive profit.
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After replacing φ∗ and f∗pi by their respective subgame perfect equilibrium value,
we find that market entry will take place according to the following condition:
pi(qu) =
(zufu + t− zpiχqpi)4
32z2pi(qu − (qpi − t))2
− F ≥ 0 (7)
The profit function is quadratic with respect to qu and we have that, for qu ≥ 0,
dpi∗(qu)
dqu
< 0. The higher the quality level chosen by the traditional institution
the lower will be the profit of the for-profit institution. Hence, it is always
possible to avoid the entry of the for-profit HEI but it is not always optimal to
do so as setting a higher qu is costly.
The quality level chosen will be determined in the initial stage of the game. The
threshold quality level after which no entry will take place is defined by qDu such
that:
(zufu + t− zpiχqpi)4
32z2pi(q
D
u − (qpi − t))2
− F = 0 (8)
This condition can be rewritten explicitly such as:
qDu = qpi − t+
(zufu − zpiχqpi + t)2
4zpi
√
2F
(9)
We see that qDu is the positive root of Eq. (8). It is increasing in zufu the money
paid by students to go study. It is also decreasing in F , in χ and in zpi. It will
also be increasing in t if t > 2
√
2F + zpiχqpi − zufu. qDu will be decreasing in qpi
for qpi >
χ(fu+t)−2
√
2F
χ2zpi
.
Stage 1
In this first stage, the incumbent sets the quality of its education qu. Follow-
ing Bain (1956)’s terminology, three kinds of behavior are possible: blockaded
entry, deterred entry and accommodated entry.
• Blockaded Entry
Here, it is such that without anticipating the potential threat of entry, the
traditional insitution will set qBu as to maximize her utility. Hence, this
assumes the same maximization problem as in the monopoly case. In this
case the optimal quality level will be set at:
qBu =
√
γ(zufu)2 + 2zufusu + 2zuf2u
2δ − γ
• Deterred Entry
In this case, the incumbent decides to choose the minimum quality level
that will allow him to avoid the entry of the for-profit institution in the
market of higher education. As computed in the previous stage of the
game, it is such that:
qDu = qpi − t+
(zufu − zpiχqpi + t)2
4zpi
√
2F
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• Accommodated Entry
In this case, the traditional institution also anticipates the potential entry
of the for-profit HEI but does not try to avoid its entry. It will therefore
choose qAu such that:
max
qu
γ
[
φ
∫ 1
θ˜s
θsqu dθs + (1− φ)
∫ 1
θs
θsqu dθs
]
+Nu(fu + su − cu) (10)
s.t.
Nu = φ(1− θ˜s)+(1−φ)(1−θs) ; θ˜s = zufu − zpifpi + t
qu − (qpi − t) ; θs =
zufu
qu
φ∗ =
(zufu + (t− zpiχqpi))2
4zpi(qu − (qpi − t)) ; f
∗
pi =
zufu + t+ zpiχqpi
2zpi
; cu = δqu
The optimal quality quA chosen
11 under accommodated entry is defined by
the following first order condition:
γ
2
[(
(1− φ∗)(1− z
2
uf
2
u
(qAu )
2
) + (φ∗)(1− (zufu + (t− zpiχqpi))
2
4(qAu − (qpi − t))2
)
)
(11)
+qAu
(
(1−φ∗) 2z
2
uf
2
u
(qAu )
3
+φ∗
(zufu + t− zpiχqpi)2
2(qAu − (qpi − t))3
+φ′
(
(1− (zufu + t− zpiχqpi)
2
4(qAu − (qpi − t))2
)−(1− z
2
uf
2
u
(qAu )
2
)
))]
(12)
−δ
[
φ∗(1− θ˜s) + (1− φ∗)(1− θs)
]
(13)
+(fu+su−cu)
(
(1−φ∗) zufu
(qAu )
2
+φ∗
(zufu + t− zpiχqpi)
(qAu − (qpi − t))2
−φ′(θ˜s−θs))
)
= 0 (14)
As for the monopoly case, the marginal effect of an increase in qAu can be disen-
tangle in several effects. The first two effects are affecting how the institution
values its production of education. Eq. (11) shows the effect created by the
increased quality on the productivity of all the students who decides to study
there. Eq. (12) shows the marginal impact created by the additional student
who decides to go there. The other two effects are concerned with the impact
that an increase in quality has on the research produced. Eq. (13) shows the
decrease in research money due to the increase in providing an education of
quality and Eq. (14) shows the additional funds allocated to research related to
the additional net income coming from having more students attracted by the
11A non-negative weighted average of two concave functions is still concave. The term
following (1 − φ) is always concave. Therefore, a sufficient condition for the term following
φ to be concave is that qpi > t, i.e. that the exposed student’s utility of going to a for-profit
institution decreases with respect to his ability. Necessary conditions will be derived ex-post
in the numerical example.
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improved quality of education. The first and second effects are always positive.
The third effect is always negative. The last effect can either be positive or
negative. It is positive when some of the surplus earned from the per-student
funding cross-subsidizes research activities. It is negative when R < 0. This is
possible because in our very simple framework we assumed that the only fund-
ing source is the amount of subsidy received per student enrolled in.
Depending on the parameters of the model, the traditional HEI will choose the
quality level (qAu , q
B
u or q
D
u ). If q
B
u > q
D
u , then entry will be blockaded. Oth-
erwise, entry will be accommodated if Uu(q
A
u ) > Uu(q
D
u ) and deterred when
Uu(q
A
u ) ≤ Uu(qDu ).
5. Analysis
The overall impact of an incremental parameter change depends on the two
effects it creates. The first is the direct impact on the entrant’s anticipated
profit (see Eq. (7)). The second is the indirect impact on the quality qu that
would be chosen in the case where entry is accommodated. This effect is related
with the disciplining effect created on the traditional HEI by the potential entry
of a for-profit HEI. Due to the impossibility to solve explicitly qAu and the fact
that the two effects are often going in an opposite direction12, it is difficult to
compute analytically which of the three behaviors will prevail. Therefore, a
numerical analysis will give, at least suggestive, evidence about the impact of
potential policy interventions.
The calibration of the model is inspired by the U.S. policy context. According
to Institute for College Access and Success (2009), the student’s tuition paid to
go to a traditional HEI is subsidized at a rate of 40% while, according to the
U.S. Department of Education (2011), students going to a for-profit institution
are subsidized at a rate of 75%. Therefore, zu and zpi are respectively equal
to 0.25 and 0.6. The other parameters are calibrated such that the following
targets are attained. According to the U.S. Department of Education (2011),
the tuition of traditional HEI fu is on average six to seven times lower than the
one at a for-profit institution fpi for similar programs content-wise. According
to LipmanHearne (2010) and computations based on the financial reports of for-
profit institutions, ΦφNpiχqpi+Φ+F , the share of spending invested in advertising
and promotional activities is between 20% and 30%. The share of students
going to a for-profit HEI NpiNpi+Nu within the population participating to a further
education program is equal to 11%. As discussed previously, we also have that
qu > qpi. The equilibrium conditions derived analytically are checked ex-post.
Parameters’ change are analyzed into three separate groups: the ones related
with the traditional institution (γ, fu and δ), the ones related with the for-
profit HEI (t, qpi and χ) and the ones related with the public financing of higher
education (zu, zpi and su). We have, in stage 3, already shown that F has
12Based on Eq. (7), we observe that a change in F has only a direct impact on entry. For
smaller fixed entry costs, entry will be more likely.
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a negative impact on the probability of entry of the for-profit HEI. The base
scenario assumes the following parameter values: γ = 1.6, zu = 0.6, fu = 1.3,
zpi = 0.25, su = 3.9 δ = 0.9, t = 2.4, qpi = 4.2, χ = 0.905 and F = 0.2. B
stands for blockaded entry and D for deterred entry. The last two columns will
be discussed in the next subsection. We look at discrete parameters’ changes
and describe how these changes impact the strategic choices made, the level of
profit as well as the student’s demand to go study in one of the two types of
HEI. We first focus on the decision to enter the market. Then, we analyze the
welfare consequences that this might have.
5.1. Numerical Analysis
Traditional HEI’s parameters
Table 2: Numerical analysis: Traditional HEI’s parameters
Parameters φ∗ f∗pi qBu > qDu q∗u U∗A U
∗
B U
∗
D pi Npi Nu W
1 W 2
γ = 1.4 0.95 8.26 No 7.1 3.8 4 3.5 0.25 0.2 0.79 0.99 -73.76
γ = 1.5 0.85 8.26 No 7.6 4.2 4.3 4 0.16 0.16 0.82 0.98 -90.63
γ = 1.6 0.74 8.26 No 8.5 4.56 4.55 4.47 0.07 0.12 0.85 0.98 -121.28
γ = 1.75 B B Yes 13.5 5.3 5.2 5.2 B B 0.93 0.94 7.07
fu = 0.1 D D No 5.4 3.4 3.7 3.5 D D 0.88 0.99 0.35
fu = 1 0.7 7.7 No 7.8 4.1 4.1 4 0.04 0.12 0.86 0.98 -61.05
fu = 1.3 0.74 8.26 No 8.5 4.56 4.55 4.47 0.07 0.12 0.85 0.98 -121.28
fu = 2 0.84 9.1 No 10.2 5.2 5.1 5 0.15 0.13 0.85 0.98 -265.36
δ = 0.81 D D No 9.7 5.46 5.41 5.27 D D 0.92 0.92 0.9
δ = 0.9 0.74 8.26 No 8.5 4.56 4.55 4.47 0.07 0.12 0.85 0.98 -121.28
δ = 0.95 0.86 8.26 No 7.5 4.55 4.54 4.02 0.17 0.17 0.82 0.98 -89.18
δ = 1 0.96 8.26 No 7 3.9 4.1 3.6 0.26 0.2 0.79 0.99 -71.62
Base case: γ = 1.6, zu = 0.6, fu = 1.3, zpi = 0.25, su = 3.9, δ = 0.9, t = 2.4, qpi = 4.2,
χ = 0.905 and F = 0.2
Table 2 shows the comparative static analysis for the parameters directly
related with the traditional HEI.
How does a change in the preferences for the education output compared to the
research output, as described by γ, influence entry? We see that, all else equal,
a higher weight given to the education output will decrease the probability that
the for-profit HEI enters the market. Although γ does not have a direct impact
on the for-profit institution’s potential profit as described in Eq. (7), it has
an indirect impact through the quality of education chosen by the traditional
HEI. A larger γ increases the quality under blockaded entry and decreases the
quality chosen under accommodation. When γ is sufficiently large, entry will
be blockaded. A higher importance given to education makes entry more diffi-
cult for the for-profit HEI. The utility of the traditional institution is increasing
in γ. The number of students enrolled in is decreasing up to the point where
entry is deterred. It further increases after the point where entry is blockaded.
A higher γ also leads to a higher cross subzidiation of research money going
towards education.
The tuitio fee fu, required to study in a traditional HEI, has also an influence
on the entry decision of the for-profit HEI. Note that it does not consider the
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subsidy received by students to encourage them to go study. A lower fee both
mean that it is cheaper for students to go to a traditional HEI and that the
institution will, all else equal, receive less funding. A higher fu has a direct
positive impact on the entrant’s potential profit. It has however, through the
indirect impact on the quality of education chosen (which will increase thanks
to the additional funding coming from students), a negative impact on this
profit. Overall, we see that the first effect is the highest, at least under this
calibration. So, for a higher fu, entry is more likely. Overall, this has a small
positive impact on the utility of the traditional HEI and a negative impact on
enrollment. Therefore, the increase in fee will not be fully compensated by the
increase in quality that is allowed due to the higher revenues of the HEI. The
amount invested in research will also be increasing in fu.
An increase in δ, the per-student cost of providing education, has no direct im-
pact on the entrant’s potential profit. However, it has a positive indirect impact
on the probability of entry because it makes it more costly to set a high level of
education quality which could potentially deter or blockade entry. This has a
negative impact on the utility of the traditional institution and on its enrollment.
Traditional HEI’s parameters
Table 3: Numerical analysis: For-profit HEI’s parameters
Parameters φ∗ f∗pi qBu > qDu q∗u U∗A U
∗
B U
∗
D pi Npi Nu W
1 W 2
t = 1.7 D D No 6.2 4.55 4.55 4.55 D D 0.87 0.88 3.28
t = 1.9 D D No 7.3 4.54 4.55 4.55 D D 0.89 0.88 3.28
t = 2.4 0.74 8.26 No 8.5 4.56 4.55 4.47 0.07 0.12 0.85 0.98 -121.28
t = 2.7 0.86 8.86 No 8.99 4.57 4.55 3.35 0.16 0.15 0.84 0.99 -172.46
qpi = 1 0.88 6.81 No 8.5 4.56 4.55 4.3 0.19 0.13 0.86 0.99 -242.7
qpi = 3 0.79 7.72 No 8.5 4.56 4.55 4.42 0.11 0.12 0.86 0.98 -161.8
qpi = 4.2 0.74 8.26 No 8.5 4.56 4.55 4.47 0.07 0.12 0.85 0.98 -121.28
qpi = 6 0.66 9.1 No 8.6 4.55 4.55 4.5 0.02 0.12 0.85 0.97 -70.13
χ = 0.8 0.79 7.83 No 8.75 4.56 4.55 4.42 0.11 0.13 0.85 0.98 -142
χ = 0.9 0.74 8.26 No 8.5 4.56 4.55 4.47 0.07 0.12 0.85 0.98 -121.28
χ = 1.1 0.65 8.67 No 8.15 4.549 4.554 4.525 0.001 0.1 0.86 0.97 -88.5
χ = 1.3 D D No 7 4.547 4.554 4.553 D D 0.89 0.89 -0.25
Base case: γ = 1.6, zu = 0.6, fu = 1.3, zpi = 0.25, su = 3.9, δ = 0.9, t = 2.4, qpi = 4.2,
χ = 0.905 and F = 0.2
Table 3 shows the comparative static results for the parameters related with
the for-profit institution.
A higher t means that there exists more opacity around the returns to education
and this increases the persuasive effect of the for-profit advertising campaigns.
It can be derived from Eq. (7) that it has a direct positive effect on both types
of institution. A higher t leads also to an indirect negative impact created by
the endogenous increase in the quality of education provided at the traditional
HEI. We see in Table 3 that the former effect will be bigger. This will there-
fore make entry more likely. Thanks to this disciplining effect on quality, the
utility of the traditional HEI will slightly increase. However, its enrollment will
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decrease.
An increase in qpi, the quality of education provided at the for-profit HEI, has
a negative impact on the profit of the entrant. Although, entry still takes place
for parameters respecting the equilibrium conditions. In this numerical analy-
sis, both the direct and indirect impact go in the same direction. It will also
have a small negative effect on the utility of the traditional institution and on
its enrollement.
An increase in χ makes it more difficult for the for-profit institution to enter.
The direct impact on the expected profit is negative. This cannot be compen-
sated by the positive indirect effect created by the decrease in qu. This increase
has a positive effect on the number of students enrolled in the traditional system.
Public financing parameters
Table 4: Numerical analysis: Public financing parameters
Parameters φ∗ f∗pi qBu > qDu q∗u U∗A U
∗
B U
∗
D pi Npi Nu W
1 W 2
zu = 0.2 D D No 6.4 4.53 4.68 4.57 D D 0.96 0.96 0.32
zu = 0.4 0.65 7.58 No 7.4 4.38 4.59 4.51 0.01 0.11 0.87 0.98 -74.63
zu = 0.6 0.74 8.26 No 8.5 4.56 4.55 4.47 0.07 0.12 0.85 0.98 -121.28
zu = 0.9 0.88 9.04 No 9.6 4.59 4.56 4.42 0.19 0.15 0.84 0.98 -223.97
su = 3 0.82 8.26 No 7.9 3.8 3.8 3.6 0.13 0.15 0.83 0.98 -99.9
su = 3.9 0.74 8.26 No 8.5 4.56 4.55 4.47 0.07 0.12 0.85 0.98 -121.28
su = 5 D D No 9.24 5.51 5.53 5.48 D D 0.92 0.92 -0.11
su = 11 B B Yes 10 10.9 11 11 B B 0.92 0.92 4.64
zpi = 0.2 0.99 9.85 No 9.1 4.59 4.55 4.23 0.3 0.16 0.83 0.98 -121.28
zpi = 0.25 0.74 8.26 No 8.5 4.56 4.55 4.47 0.07 0.12 0.85 0.98 -121.28
zpi = 0.3 D D No 8 4.54 4.55 4.55 D D 0.89 0.89 -0.14
zpi = 0.4 B B Yes 4.52 4.55 4.55 4.44 B B 0.88 0.88 3.28
Base case: γ = 1.6, zu = 0.6, fu = 1.3, zpi = 0.25, su = 3.9, δ = 0.9, t = 2.4, qpi = 4.2,
χ = 0.905 and F = 0.2
Table 4 shows the parameters related with the public funding granted to the
HEI and to the students going to a traditional/for-profit institution.
Recall that zu is the share of the tuition fee that the student pays out of his
pocket. A higher zu means that the student will pay a larger share. Although,
note that this will not have a direct impact on the HEI’s budget. All else equal,
a larger zu has a direct positive impact on entry. However, it is leading to
an increase in the quality of education set by the traditional HEI in order to
keep attracting students due to the rise of what they have to pay to study. The
indirect effect will therefore be negative. Under our configuration, the first effect
will be more than compensated by the second effect and entry will be easier the
larger zu. Overall, this creates a negative impact on the enrollment.
The direct per-student subsidy received by the traditional HEI is represented by
su. An increase in the subsidy has no direct impact on the probability of entry
of the for-profit HEI. However, this increase in the budget leads to an increase
in the quality of education chosen. This leads to a negative indirect effect on
the likeliness of entry. When su increases, the number of students enrolled in
also increases as well as its utility.
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The share of the fee that is actually paid by the student when going to a for-profit
HEI is formalized by zpi. A higher zpi has both a direct and an indirect negative
impact on the profit of the for-profit institution. This has an unambiguous
negative effect on the decision to enter. A higher zpi leads to a decrease in
the utility of the traditional institution despite the increase in the number of
students it enrolls. This is due to the lower benefits derived from the lower
quality of education provided created by the lack of disciplining device from
competition.
5.2. Welfare Analysis
The aim of this subsection is to relate this model to government interven-
tions. Abstracting from the issues associated with the opportunity cost of public
funds or the externalities created by education, we can show that caring about
the democratic objectives of education rather than about the social welfare de-
rived from higher education can lead to a very different welfare appreciation of
the model’s parameters13. Entry will always be preferred when using the first
of these two criteria.
The trade-off between the accessibility of the higher education system and of
the quality of the programs offered can be shown using two different welfare
functions. The first is such that:
W 1 =
{
Nu if no entry
Nu +Npi if entry
This social welfare function puts forward the importance given to the democ-
ratization of higher education. This is often used by office holders. It has the
advantage of being easy to compute. It avoids the question of the measure of the
quality of the educational program. It also shows quickly the direct impact of
a policy change by looking at the number of students enrolled in the beginning
of the year.
The second is the sum of the student’s net benefits from education, the tradi-
tional HEI’s utility and the profit of the for-profit HEI minus the amount of
public funding invested in subsidizing students and HEIs. For simplicity, all
these components are equally weighted. As discussed in Bagwell (2007), the
artificial impact of advertising on the student’s preferences to go to a for-profit
HEI will not be considered in this welfare analysis. Although the overall impact
of advertising on welfare can still be positive depending on how it impacts the
13The issue behind this welfare analysis is closely related to the problematic of damaged
goods (Deneckere and McAfee (2005)), as analyzed in the industrial organization literature.
There, a monopolist has to decide whether or not to sell a second good of a lower, damaged,
quality. This allows him to implement second degree price discrimination. Even when this
second good is more costly to produce, the monopolist may find it profitable to sell it if it
sufficiently increases the number of consumers. In this context, it is possible that this new
good creates a welfare improvement.
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choice of the quality of education. When there is no entry, it is such that:
W 2 =
{ ∫ 1
θs
(θsqu − zufu) dθs + Uu −Nu((1− zu)fu + sU ) if no entry
(1− φ) ∫ 1
θs
(θsqu − zufu) dθs + φ
∫ 1
˜˜
θs
(θsqu − zufu) dθs + φ
∫ ˜˜θs
0
(θsqpi − zpifpi) dθs
+Uu + pi −Nu((1− zu)fu + su)−Npi(1− zpi)fpi if entry
Computations for each parameters are in the last two columns of Tables 2, 3
and 4. Note that W 1 and W 2 cannot be compared in the absolute. However,
we can analyze the impact at the margin of a change in parameter. It is quite
interesting to see that both welfare criterion lead to very different conclusions.
Entry is highly valued by the first criteria because it opens the HE system to
a larger number of students. Under the second criteria, entry always leads to a
lower welfare level. This last result is independent from the impact of avoiding
entry on the quality of education chosen (which is positive for an increase in γ, δ
or su and negative for the other parameters). In this case, entry weights heavily
on the public finances and its quality is not sufficient to surpass the costs faced
by students attending it.
6. Discussion
The incentives to improve the quality of for-profit education
An important assumption of the model presented in this paper is that qpi is
exogenous. Due to the non-monotonic relationship between qpi and the decision
to enter the market, it is complicated to endogenize qpi. A simpler framework
would be needed. However, it is still possible to show the condition under which
an increase in qpi would decrease the expected profit of the entering institution
and make entry less likely. The sufficient condition14 such that Eq. (7) is de-
creasing with respect to qpi is: χ˜ >
zufu+t
(2t+qu)zpi
. Under this condition, the for-profit
institution will have no incentive to improve the quality of its education if it
had the possibility. This condition also shows how, by increasing the minimum
quality standard needed to enroll subsidized students, the entry decision of the
for-profit institution can be negatively impacted.
The strategic choice of advertising and fees
To explain the high level of advertising expenditures observed in the for-
profit sector, we can show that choosing both a high level of advertising expen-
ditures and of fees is optimal for the for-profit institution. As derived from the
Dorfman-Steiner approach to advertising (Dorfman and Steiner (1954)), this can
14Note that this does not consider the presence of the indirect disciplining effect. It is
complicated to find analytical conditions such that dqu/dqpi > 0. However, in all the numerical
simulations computed with respect to qpi , the disciplinig effect was small and had a negative
impact on the entrant’s profit (see Table 3).
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be done by showing15 that the student’s demand is more sensitive to advertising
than to fees, i.e. that the price elasticity of demand η = zpifpiqu−qpi+t is smaller than
the marginal value of advertising µ = fpi
zufu−zpifpi+t
qu−qpi+t . In our framework, this
condition will hold for fees lower than fpi where fpi =
zufu+t+
√
zpi(t+qu−qpi)
zpi
. As
reviewed in Jacobs (2004), the price elasticity of student’s demand tend to be
low (between 0.03 and 0.37). To our knowledge, no studies have computed the
marginal value of advertising in higher education. However, recent works have
highlighted a large impact on the student’s demand of improving the informa-
tion available concerning the benefits of higher education (see a.o. Bettinger
et al. (2012)).
Perceived vs. effective benefits of education: The role of informa-
tion
This chapter also highlights an issue related with the difficulty to assess ex-
ante what the effective benefits of education will be. The government faces the
possibility that for-profit institutions take advantage of this informational asym-
metry, especially if students, instead of the traditional higher education system,
are subsidized. Due to their governance structure (where professors and stu-
dents are often part of the decision making process) and their non-distribution
constraint, traditional institutions are unlikely to take advantage of the opac-
ity surrounding the benefits of further studying. By improving the information
about the returns to education (decreasing t), the legislator will make the en-
try of the for-profit institution less likely. This could be done, for example, by
publishing more extensively data on labor market outcomes and on loan reim-
bursement rates of former students. The importance of the persuasive effect
might also be damaged by critiques made openly in the press (see a.o. The
Economist (2010) and The New York Times (2011)).
Supply- vs. demand-side funding
We have shown that, all else equal, an increase in the subsidies given to
students makes entry more likely. On the other hand, an increase in the subsidy
given to the traditional HEI makes entry less likely. This result would still hold
and would even be reinforced if the total amount of per-student subsidy (given
to them and granted via their hosting institution) was fixed and the allocation
was more going in the direction of the indirect per-student subsidy. We have
also assumed that the fee fu of the traditional institution was exogenous. If the
Bennet hypothesis was also observed at the level of the traditional institution,
a higher fee created by an increase in the subsidy given to students would fur-
ther facilitate entry of the for-profit institution. This would reinforce this result.
15We abstract from second order effects due to the endogenous quality of education provided
in the traditional sector.
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7. Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to propose a framework that allows to show
the market conditions which facilitate the entry of for-profit institutions in the
higher education market. It both highlights (1) that students can still decide to
study there even if this human capital decision brings them lower net returns on
investment than the other options available and (2) that a legislator might still
want to implement policies that would lead to for-profit friendly market condi-
tions. We show how advertising plays a crucial role in explaining the student’s
decision to study in those institutions. Even when entry has a positive disciplin-
ing effect on the traditional HEI, subsidizing students (especially if the money
can be used to study in a for-profit HEI) instead of directly subsidizing tradi-
tional institutions will facilitate the emergence of for-profit institutions. Even
though for-profit HEIs are not desirable from a social welfare point of view, we
argue that it still allows the legislator to fulfill his objective of increasing the
access to the higher education system to as many students as possible.
To our knowledge, this theoretical model is a first approach to the issue of the
entry of for-profit institution in the higher education market. It faces as several
caveats that could lead to as many avenues for further research.
First of all, we assumed a very simple production function of education. Further
extensions could also consider the role played by peer effects or by student’s ef-
fort required to have his degree.
Second, as often done in the literature on the competition between HEIs, we
supposed that for-profit and traditional institutions were strategically interact-
ing to attract students. Thus far, there is no empirical data to support this
hypothesis. However, it is important to consider that, as previously said, policy
makers often make this assumption when intervening in this market. In the
absence of a competitive disciplinary effect, our welfare conclusions would still
hold and would most likely be even stronger. Although some of the parameters
might have a different impact on the entry decision than under our analysis.
Third, our assumptions concerning the strategies chosen by the two types of
institutions could be endogenized. To allow for this possibility, a simpler frame-
work would be needed.
Finally, as discussed in Scott-Clayton (2012), students are imperfectly informed
about the costs and benefits of pursuing their education. In our model, this
assumption was only made when students considered the possibility to go to a
for-profit HEI. Although, it led for-profit higher education students to a nega-
tive ex-post net return to education. This is rather extreme as the marketing
practices of for-profit HEIs can, at least partially, solve the information prob-
lem faced by some students (the ones badly informed about the net returns to
traditional education and for whom for-profit education has still a positive net
return). These considerations tell us that the benefits of entry are undervalued
according to the second welfare criteria. To be able to consider this, a richer
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description of the role of information in the student’s decision making process
would be needed.
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